

VEDHIK

**DAILY NEWS
ANALYSIS**

04 - FEBRUARY - 2022

FOREWORD

We, at Team Vedhik is happy to introduce a new initiative - "Daily Current Affairs_The Hindu" compilations to help you with UPSC Civil Services Examination preparation. We believe this initiative - "Daily Current Affairs_The Hindu" would help students, especially beginners save time and streamline their preparations with regard to Current Affairs. A content page and an Appendix has been added segregating and mapping the content to the syllabus.

It is an appreciable efforts by Vedhik IAS Academy helping aspirants of UPSC Civil Services Examinations. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Babu Sebastian, former VC - MG University in extending all support to this endeavour. Finally I also extend my thanks to thank Ms. Shilpa Sasidharan and Mr. Shahul Hameed for their assistance in the preparing the compilations.

We welcome your valuable comments so that further improvement may be made in the forthcoming material. We look forward to feedback, comments and suggestions on how to improve and add value for students. Every care has been taken to avoid typing errors and if any reader comes across any such error, the authors shall feel obliged if they are informed at their Email ID.

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Winter is here

The games in China have taken on political significance, domestically and globally

On the eve of the opening of the Winter Olympics in Beijing on Friday, India announced a diplomatic boycott of the games. The MEA said no Indian official will be present at the opening or closing ceremonies of the games, which run from February 4 to 20. The decision for an official boycott of the games – a lone Indian athlete who qualified, skier Arif Khan, will still take part in both the games and in the opening ceremony along with support staff – followed China's move this week to choose a PLA commander as one of the participants of the traditional torch relay. The commander was involved in the June 15, 2020 clash in Galwan Valley. He was subsequently given military honours by Beijing. The MEA said the commander's participation in the torch relay was "regrettable". Until this week, New Delhi was considering having its top diplomat in Beijing attend the games. Only in November, India joined Russia in expressing support for the games, following a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, India and China. If India, dealing with its own long list of problems with China and a continuing stand-off along the Line of Actual Control, had initially planned to not involve itself in the politics surrounding the games, Beijing's torch relay changed that calculus. The broader context of the selection of the PLA commander is an on-going campaign by China to publicise Galwan and highlight the "bravery" of PLA troops.

India's statement of support for the games in November had come amid the U.S. and its allies announcing a diplomatic boycott because of rights violations in Xinjiang, where minority Uighurs have been sent to "re-education" camps. China first denied the existence of the camps, but later said they were for "vocational training". China denounced the diplomatic boycott by around a dozen countries – which India has now joined albeit for different reasons – as "politicising" the games. It is another matter that Olympic Games, through history, have been inherently political events. For host nations, holding a successful games carries the promise of burnishing the legitimacy of the government of the day. The games within China have certainly taken on particular political significance domestically, in the context of the country's battle against COVID-19. Last month, President Xi Jinping noted that the 2022 Olympics would be "the first international multi-sport event to be held as scheduled since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic". The underlying message is that the successful holding of the games amid the pandemic is another example of the superiority of the Chinese political model, which has been highlighted as a sharp contrast especially with how the U.S. handled the pandemic. Last year, the IOA added the word "together" to the official Olympic motto of "faster, higher, stronger". If that is certainly a laudable aspiration, it is clear that as far as the Olympics are concerned, the politics is never far away. That will certainly be the case in Beijing as the latest games, both on and off the ski slopes, begin.

Indian diplomats to boycott Beijing games

Selection of PLA's Galwan soldier as torchbearer sparks row

SUHASINI HAIDAR

NEW DELHI

Terming China's decision to field a People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldier involved in the June 2020 Galwan clashes as the torchbearer for the Winter Olympics Games in Beijing as "regrettable", India announced a diplomatic boycott of the games just ahead of the opening ceremony on Friday.

State broadcaster Doordarshan also announced it will not telecast the opening and closing ceremonies live, where India has one athlete, skier Arif Khan, participating. The decision came after Chinese media reports identified Qi Fabao, a PLA regiment commander who received military honours for the Galwan clashes, where he was injured, as one of about 1,200 runners bearing the torch at a relay in Beijing.

China's decision to field him and New Delhi's announcement of its first ever diplomatic boycott of Olympic Games, are likely to increase India-China tensions

Tensions spill over

It is the first time that India has announced a diplomatic boycott of the Olympic Games ceremony

WHO ALL ARE BOYCOTTING (SENDING SPORTS TEAM BUT NO DIPLOMATS OR POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES) THE EVENT?

■ India (due to Chinese "politicisation" of games, fielding Galwan PLA commander as torchbearer)

■ The U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Czech Republic (due to human rights concerns in Xinjiang, Tibet, etc)

■ Austria, Sweden (due to COVID-19 protocols)



that have risen since PLA aggressions along the Line of Actual Control in April 2020.

India had earlier expressed support for the Beijing Olympics, even as more than a dozen countries, led by the U.S. had announced a boycott of the games.

"It is indeed regrettable that the Chinese side has chosen to politicise an event like Olympic," said MEA spokesperson Arindam Bagchi, referring to the media reports. "The Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of India in Beijing will not be

attending the opening or closing ceremony of the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics," he added.

The Indian Ambassador to China, Pradeep Kumar Rawat is expected to take charge in the next few weeks, and hence the Charge d'Affaires Acquino Vimal is the top diplomat in Beijing at present.

Mr. Vimal and other officials were expected to attend the ceremonial functions at the games.

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Indian diplomats to boycott Beijing games

However, the MEA had said no political or high level representation would be sent from Delhi.

Prasar Bharti chief Shashi Shekhar Vempati also tweeted that “consequent to the announcement by the MEA”, Doordarshan’s sports channel would not telecast the Olympic ceremonies, as planned earlier.

The Chinese decision to publicly honour the military commander for involvement in the deadly clashes in the Galwan valley, where 20 Indian soldiers, and at least four Chinese soldiers (far higher according to media reports) were killed, is seen as a deliberate insult to New Delhi, which came despite the fact that the Modi government had decided not to join western boycott calls over human rights con-

cerns. In November 2021, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had hosted a virtual Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral meeting which issued a joint statement where they “expressed their support to China to host Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games.”

Meanwhile Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan, Presidents of five Central Asian republics Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are due to attend the opening ceremony on Friday.

The Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Mr. Khan would meet Mr. Xi and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and conclude a number of bilateral agreements.

Jan. PMI reflects further easing in services activity

Business confidence hits 6-month low

PRESS TRUST OF INDIA

NEW DELHI

India's services sector activity moderated further in January as new business rose at a noticeably slower rate amid the escalation of the pandemic, reintroduction of restrictions and inflationary pressures, a monthly survey showed on Thursday.

The seasonally adjusted India Services Business Activity Index fell to 51.5 in January, from 55.5 in December, pointing to the slowest rate of expansion in the six-month sequence of growth.

According to survey participants, demand was restricted by the fast spread of the Omicron variant and the reinstatement of curfews in parts of the country.



The spread of the Omicron variant affected demand. Resultant concerns led to job shedding

Companies became increasingly worried that growth would be harmed by the intensification of the pandemic, reintroduction of curbs and inflationary pressures. Business sentiment remained positive but slipped to a six-month low.

"Concerns about how long the current wave of COVID-19 will last dampened business confidence and caused job shedding," said Pollyanna De Lima, Economics Associate Director at IHS Markit. "Firms were also alarmed about price pressures," she added.

DAILY NEWS ANALYSIS

COURTESY THE HINDU



• VIJAY SONEJI

EXPLAINER

The need to boost labour income and consumption expenditure

What are the features of fiscal consolidation and how is it shaping the Budget allocation?

ZICO DASGUPTA
KAVYA MENON

THE GIST

- The squeeze in labour income and consumption expenditure witnessed during the pandemic was preceded by what turned out to be the longest episode of growth slowdown in the Indian economy since the liberalisation period. The budget 2022 was placed in the midst of these challenges.

- With the objective of fiscal consolidation, the budget falls short of these challenges. Firstly, while share of revenue and non-debt receipts in GDP has remained unchanged, the objective of fiscal consolidation has been sought to be achieved primarily by reducing the expenditure-GDP ratio. Secondly, since the bulk of the revenue expenditure comprises of food subsidies and expenses in social and economic services, reduction in capital allocation has been associated with fall in several key expenditure that affect the income and livelihood of labour. Thirdly, despite sharp increase in profits during the pandemic, the corporate tax-GDP ratio has continued to remain below the 2018-19 level due to tax concessions.

- If the GDP growth rate and revenue growth rate happens to be lower than what is projected, then the actual expenditure can turn out to be even lower than what is projected. But even if the actual expenditure is close to the target estimates, the recovery of labour income and consumption expenditure would be largely restricted by the manner in which fiscal consolidation has been carried out.

The story so far: The Union Budget for 2022-23 has projected a fiscal deficit of 6.4% of nominal GDP, a narrowing from the 6.9% assumed in the revised estimates for the current fiscal year ending on March 31. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said the move was "consistent with the broad path of fiscal consolidation announced" by her last year in order to reach a fiscal deficit level below 4.5% by 2025-26. "While setting the fiscal deficit level in 2022-23, I am conscious of the need to nurture growth, through public investment, to become stronger and sustainable," she added.

What was the economic context to this year's Budget formulation? Though every economic crisis involves sharp reduction in output growth rate, the specificity of the present crisis in India lies in the sharper reduction in labour income as compared to profits. The consequent reduction in income share of labour was associated with a sharp fall in consumption-GDP ratio as well as absolute value of consumption expenditure during the pandemic. While the GDP in 2021-22 is estimated to attain the pre-pandemic level, real consumption expenditure remains to be lower as compared to 2019-20.

The squeeze in labour income and consumption expenditure witnessed during the pandemic was itself preceded by what turned out to be the longest episode of growth slowdown in the Indian economy since the liberalisation period.



The budget 2022 was placed in the midst of these distinct challenges. The first challenge is specific to the pandemic and pertained to the need of undertaking policies that boosts labour income and consumption expenditure. The second challenge pertained to addressing the structural constraints of the Indian economy that restricted growth even during the pre-pandemic period.

How has the Budget fared in this backdrop and what are the key shortcomings?


Continuing with the objective of fiscal consolidation, the Budget falls short of addressing both these challenges.

There are three distinct features of this fiscal consolidation process. Firstly, while share of revenue and non-debt receipts in GDP has remained more or less unchanged, the objective of fiscal consolidation has been sought to be

Some Budget figures at a glance



SOURCE: ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS



SOURCE: RECEIPT BUDGET OF VARIOUS YEARS



SOURCE: ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND BUDGETS OF VARIOUS YEARS

achieved primarily by reducing the expenditure-GDP ratio (see figure 1). The brunt of this expenditure compression fell on revenue expenditure. Continuing with the fiscal strategy adopted in the last two years since the pandemic, the allocation of capital expenditure as a share of GDP has been marginally increased in 2022-23 as compared to 2021-22. Though additional capital expenditure could be financed either by postponing fiscal consolidation process or by increasing revenue, however, the budget has sought to achieve fiscal consolidation by reducing the allocation for revenue expenditure-GDP ratio.

Secondly, since the bulk of the revenue expenditure comprises of food subsidies and current expenses in social and economic services, reduction in the allocation for revenue expenditure has been associated with fall in several key expenditure that affect the income and livelihood of labour (see figure 2). For example, allocation for both agriculture and allied activities and rural

compared to 2021-22. Similarly, in the midst of the ongoing pandemic, total nominal expenditure on medical and public health registered a sharp fall in 2022-23 as compared to 2021-22. Such expenditure compression has been associated with the overall fall in the allocation for total social sector expenditure.

Thirdly, despite sharp increase in profits during the pandemic, the corporate tax-GDP ratio has continued to remain below the 2018-19 level due to tax concessions. The last decade registered a sharp rise in the share of corporate tax concessions in GDP, which reached its peak at 3.9% by 2020-21 (see figure 3).

Reflecting the trend in tax concessions, corporate tax-GDP ratio registered a decline particularly since 2018-19 when corporate tax ratio declined sharply from 3.5% to 2.7%. Despite the objective of fiscal consolidation, the corporate tax ratio continues to remain low and restrict revenue receipts.

What are the implications for development spending?

The objective of fiscal consolidation along with the inability to increase revenue receipts has posed a constraint on development expenditure. With non-development expenditure comprising of interest payments, administrative expenditure and various other components which are typically rigid downward, the brunt of expenditure compression has fallen on development expenditure.

Figure 4 shows the trend in share of centre's development expenditure (development expenditure is calculated as the sum of expenditures on social services and economic services) in GDP since 2008-09. While the decade of 2010s was characterised by different government meeting fiscal targets by adjusting their expenditure, it registered a sharp decline in the development expenditure ratio till the advent of the pandemic in 2019-20. Albeit to a limited extent, the fiscal stimulus implemented in the first year of the pandemic brought about a brief recovery in 2020-21. The fiscal consolidation strategy carried out in the last years has once again led the

What the Indian economy lacks at the moment is an effective policy instrument that can boost labour income and aggregate demand.

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A disjointed response

Regulatory clarity on crypto assets should have accompanied the tax on traders' profits

One of the most striking moves in the Union Budget's taxation proposals for 2022-23 is the introduction of a taxation regime for virtual digital assets – evolving manifestations of cryptocurrencies, codes and non-fungible tokens. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has proposed to tax all profits from transactions in such assets at 30% along with the applicable surcharge and cess, and a 1% tax to be deducted by buyers while trading in any virtual digital asset beyond a threshold. While the tax on profits will apply from April 1, 2022, which officials said will not preclude profits already booked before that date from the tax liability, the TDS provisions aimed at creating a transaction trail for the tax authorities, will kick in from July 1. While trading profits will be taxed at, according to crypto industry players, a higher rate compared to other jurisdictions, no deductions will be allowed on account of setting off losses from such trading or from any other capital losses. The only deduction permitted would be the cost of acquiring the asset. The term 'property' under the I-T Act is being expanded to include virtual digital assets so that such assets received as a gift shall be taxable except when received from relatives. However, the taxation regime by itself, Ms. Sitharaman has emphasised, does not grant legitimacy to the trade in these currently unregulated assets. A consultation process is underway, which will determine the legal position of such assets.

This provides some relief for the growing flock of crypto investors. The Government may still not consider them fully legit, yet the tax regime indicates the hard option of an outright ban that was signalled in the nomenclature of a proposed crypto law last year is off the table. Listed first for Parliament's monsoon session, then again in the winter, that legislation is also now off the agenda. All this time, India's youth, who the Prime Minister worried were being lured by crypto players' misleading ads, continue to be swayed, with no norms brought in place to rein in such ballyhoo, and no regulatory watch. Whether this case is different from collective investment and plantation schemes that were belatedly regulated is ponderable. The delay in arriving at a decision also pre-empts Indian start-ups and innovators from developing products and ideas that can be scaled up globally given the nature of these assets. In November, the Government had indicated a forward-looking approach to crypto market oversight. It is time those words are matched with a clear regulatory framework soon instead of ambiguous waffling and dithering.

Chandrayaan-3 set for launch in August

It is a follow-up to Chandrayaan-2 launched in 2019

JACOB KOSHY
NEW DELHI

India plans to execute the Chandrayaan-3 mission this August, Minister Jitendra Singh told the Lok Sabha on Wednesday.

Though the government had stated that the mission was scheduled for 2022, this is the first time that a specific month has been announced.

The Chandrayaan-3 mission is a follow-up of Chan-

drayaan-2 of July 2019, which aimed to land a rover on the lunar South Pole.

It was sent aboard the country's most powerful geosynchronous launch vehicle, the GSLV-Mk 3. However, lander Vikram, instead of a controlled landing, ended up crash-landing on September 7, 2019, and prevented rover Pragyaan from successfully travelling on the surface of the moon.

Had the mission been successful, it would have been the first time a country landed its rover on the moon in its maiden attempt.

"Based on the learnings from Chandrayaan-2 and suggestions made by the national level experts, the realisation of Chandrayaan-3 is in progress. Many related hardware and their special tests are successfully completed. The launch is scheduled for August 2022," Mr. Singh said in reply to a query from Ravneet Singh and Subburaman Thirunavukkarasar who wanted to know what delayed the mission.

The Minister attributed them to "pandemic linked" delays and a "reprioritisation" of projects.

The last major satellite launches by the ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation) were the Earth Observation Satellite-3 in August last and the Amazonia satellite in February.

The ISRO has planned 19 missions until December consisting of eight launch vehicle missions, seven spacecraft missions and four technology demonstrator missions.

The ISRO has been allotted ₹13,700 crore for this financial year, nearly ₹1,000 crore more than it spent last year.

A border move that will only bolster China

The attempt to delink the strategically important area of Depsang from the ongoing Ladakh border crisis is worrying



SUSHANT SINGH

After the 1962 Sino-India War was over, the Indian Army was confronted with the problem of bodies of around 190 Indian soldiers lying in areas around 8 kilometres to 16 kilometres inside the Chinese 1960 claim line in Ladakh. Collecting the bodies of the fallen soldiers after the war through mutual consent is an established military practice, and the Indian Red Cross wrote to its Chinese counterpart in April 1963. The Chinese turned down the request, stating that the bodies had been properly buried, and there was no need to send any Indian parties into disputed areas. As most Indian soldiers were to be cremated, not buried, the issue was again taken up with the Chinese. In August, the Chinese agreed to carry out the cremation and hand over the ashes to the Indian Red Cross.

When the Indian Red Cross requested that Indian representatives be present during the ceremony, the Chinese cancelled the arrangements altogether. In its memo on September 16, 1963, the Chinese Foreign Ministry accused the Indian government of trying to lay claim to these territories through this device.

While cancelling these arrangements, the Chinese Foreign Ministry insisted that the Indians who died at their posts in Ladakh were 'invaders' and not defending their 'motherland'. Earlier, after overcoming the stiff Indian resistance at Rezang La, memorialised in the Hindi film, *Haqueeqat*, and at Gurung Hill, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had buried the bodies of five Indian soldiers – wooden posts with the inscriptions in Chinese and English, 'The Corpses of Indian Invaders'. The purpose of the elaborate exercise was to deny any legitimate Indian presence

and claim over these areas in future negotiations. If Indian soldiers had died defending their motherland, then it was an area in Indian possession and control – that would belie the Chinese claim over the territories in Ladakh. Its efforts to create facts on the ground to bolster its 'historical' claim underline the extent of Chinese enterprise in asserting its territorial claims.

Delinking Depsang

It thus comes as a surprise that in a recent television interview, the Indian Army Chief, General M.M. Naravane, argued that "out of the five or six friction points (in Ladakh), five have been solved". 'Friction point' is an Indian euphemism for points of Chinese ingress into hitherto India-controlled territory in Ladakh, where this control is exercised by the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) through regular patrols to the claimed areas. These 'friction points' are Depsang, Galwan, Hot Springs, Gogra, North bank of Pangong Tso, Kailash Range and Demchok. By asserting that only one of the friction points is remaining to be resolved – he was referring to Hot Springs or PPI5, the only one discussed in the last round of talks with the Chinese – he implicitly ruled out Depsang as an area to be resolved. This attempt to delink the strategically important area of Depsang from the ongoing Ladakh border crisis is worrying. It may suit the domestic political agenda of the Narendra Modi government of proclaiming an early end to the crisis, but it has long-term strategic consequences for India.

Depsang is an enclave of flat terrain located in an area the Army classifies as Sub-Sector North (SSN), which provides land access to Central Asia through the Karakoram Pass. A few kilometres south-east from the important air-strip of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), the Chinese army has blocked Indian patrols since early 2020 at a place called Y-junction or Bottleneck, denying it access to five PPs: PPI0, PPI1, PPIIA, PPI2 and PPI3. A joint patrol of the ITBP and Army would



GETTY IMAGES/STOCKPHOTO

patrol these five PPs approximately once a month. Y-junction is around 18 km on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control, even though the Chinese claim line lies another five kilometres further west, to the east of Burtse town. Satellite imagery from November 2021 confirms Chinese deployments at the Y-junction: two PLA Ground Force camps with six infantry fighting vehicles split between two positions while a small Indian Army forward camp is stationed 1.2 km west of the Y-junction.

Stand-off in 2013 and patrols

The Indian forward camp is the new patrol base, with a permanent patrol deployed there, that was created after a 22-day long stand-off at Y-junction in April 2013. Since then, it has observed and stopped Chinese patrols from moving further to the Indian side, but a PLA patrol had still managed to get up to around 1.5 km short of Burtse in September 2015. Essentially, till the current blockade, the Indian side was able to access the five patrolling points, asserting Indian control, while the PLA had been denied access to its claim line since the late 2000s. That status quo has been disturbed since early 2020.

Since the Ladakh border crisis came to light in May 2020, a section of the security establishment has tried to bury any conversation about Depsang. Media reports attributable to 'sources' have labelled it a 'legacy issue', suggesting that the crisis has continued since April 2013. The 2013 stand-off was

resolved diplomatically after negotiations led to reversal of an Indian ingress and bunker construction on the Chinese side in Chumar, while the PLA stepped away from the Y-junction. Lt. Gen. K.T. Parraik (retd.), the then Northern Army Commander, has confirmed "resorting to a quid pro quo, as we did during the Depsang intrusion in 2013. Early response creates leverage."

Former Ladakh Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma (retd.) was categorical in asserting that "patrolling had continued, as planned, since [the] April/May 2013 stand-off" and "to now state that we were not able to reach our LOP since 2013 as [the] PLA was blocking our movement, is pure heresy". The fact that specific major general-level talks for Depsang were held with the Chinese on August 8, 2020 proves that it is part of the ongoing crisis. A 22-day stand-off in 2013 generated much public and media outrage but a 22-month long blockade of patrolling rights in the same area now has been greeted with silence.

Depsang's importance

The Army has always identified Depsang plains as where it finds itself most vulnerable in Ladakh, devising plans to tackle the major Chinese challenge. SSN's flat terrain of Depsang, Trig Heights and DBO – which provides direct access to Aksai Chin – is suited for mechanised warfare but is located at the end of only one very long and tenuous communication axis for India. China, in turn, has multiple roads that provide easy access to the area. This leaves SSN highly vulnerable to capture by the PLA, with a few thousands of square kilometres from the Karakoram Pass to Burtse, likely to be lost. Nowhere else in Ladakh is the PLA likely to gain so much territory in a single swoop.

SSN lies to the east of Siachen, located between the Saltoro ridge on the Pakistani border and the Saser ridge close to the Chinese border. On paper, it is the only place where a physical military collusion can take place between

Pakistan and China – and the challenge of a two-front war can become real in the worst-case scenario. If India loses this area, it will be nearly impossible to launch a military operation to wrest back Gilgit-Baltistan from Pakistan.

Theoretically, Depsang is also seen as a viable launchpad for a mechanised force-based military offensive launched by India inside Aksai Chin, if the Army has to fulfil Union Home Minister Amit Shah's parliamentary vow of getting back Aksai Chin from China.

Danger of delinking

The biggest danger of delinking Depsang from the current border crisis in Ladakh, however, is of corroborating the Chinese argument, which invalidates the rightful Indian claim over a large swathe of territory. In sparsely populated areas like Ladakh, with limited forward deployment of troops, the only assertion of territorial claims is by regular patrolling. By arguing that the blockade at Y-junction predates the current stand-off – a 'legacy issue' that goes back years – the Chinese side can affirm that Indian patrols never had access to this area and thus India has no valid claim on the territory. Already living with the disadvantage of being a lesser power vis-à-vis China, this argument further weakens India's hand during negotiations in Ladakh.

This will be akin to Prime Minister Narendra Modi's statement during the all-party meeting in June 2020 that no one had entered Indian territory, which ended up bolstering Chinese position during the talks. India cannot afford to repeat that blunder again and lose its land. As was demonstrated by China in the aftermath of the 1962 War, there should be no holding back in painstakingly asserting one's claims when it comes to safeguarding the territory. Denial of truth for domestic political gains, in this case, will certainly be to the detriment of India's strategic interests.

Sushant Singh is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research

| General Studies Paper I | |
|-------------------------|---|
| A | History of Indian culture will cover the salient aspects of art forms, literature and architecture from ancient to modern times; |
| B | Modern Indian history from about the middle of the eighteenth century until the present-significant events, personalities, issues; |
| C | Freedom struggle-its various stages and important contributors / contributions from different parts of the country; |
| D | Post-independence consolidation and reorganization within the country; |
| E | History of the world will include events from 18 th century such as industrial revolution, world wars, re-drawal of national boundaries, colonization, decolonization, |
| F | Political philosophies like communism, capitalism, socialism etc.-their forms and effect on the society |
| G | Salient features of Indian Society, Diversity of India; |
| H | Effects of globalization on Indian society; |
| I | Role of women and women's organization; |
| J | Social empowerment, communalism, regionalism & secularism |
| K | Salient features of world's physical geography; |
| L | Geographical features and their location- changes in critical geographical features (including water bodies and ice-caps) and in flora and fauna and the effects of such changes; |
| M | Important Geophysical phenomena such as earthquakes, Tsunami, Volcanic activity, cyclone etc. |
| N | Distribution of key natural resources across the world (including South Asia and the Indian subcontinent); |
| O | Factors responsible for the location of primary, secondary, and tertiary sector industries in various parts of the world (including India); |
| P | Population and associated issues; |
| Q | Urbanization, their problems and their remedies |
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General Studies Paper II

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| A | India and its neighbourhood- relations; |
| B | Important International institutions, agencies and fora- their structure, mandate; |
| C | Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India's interests; |
| D | Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests. |
| E | Indian Constitution, historical underpinnings, evolution, features, amendments, significant provisions and basic structure; |
| F | Comparison of the Indian Constitutional scheme with other countries; |
| G | Functions and responsibilities of the Union and the States, issues and challenges pertaining to the federal structure, devolution of powers and finances up to local levels and challenges therein; Inclusive growth and issues arising from it; |
| H | Parliament and State Legislatures - structure, functioning, conduct of business, powers & privileges and issues arising out of these; |
| I | Structure, organization and functioning of the executive and the judiciary, Ministries and Departments; |

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| J | Separation of powers between various organs dispute redressal mechanisms and institutions; |
| K | Appointment to various Constitutional posts, powers, functions and responsibilities of various Constitutional bodies; |
| L | Statutory, regulatory and various quasi-judicial bodies; |
| M | Mechanisms, laws, institutions and bodies constituted for the protection and betterment of these vulnerable sections; |
| N | Salient features of the Representation of People's Act; |
| O | Important aspects of governance, transparency and accountability, e-governance- applications, models, successes, limitations, and potential; |
| P | Citizens charters, transparency & accountability and institutional and other measures; |
| Q | Issues relating to poverty and hunger, |
| R | Welfare schemes for vulnerable sections of the population by the Centre and States, Performance of these schemes; |
| S | Issues relating to development and management of social sector / services relating to education and human resources; |
| T | Issues relating to development and management of social sector / services relating to health |
| | |

General Studies Paper III

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| A | Indian Economy and issues relating to planning, mobilization of resources, growth, development and employment; |
| B | Effects of liberalization on the economy, changes in industrial policy and their effects on industrial growth; |
| C | Inclusive growth and issues arising from it; |
| D | Infrastructure Energy, Ports, Roads, Airports, Railways etc. Government budgeting; |
| E | Land reforms in India |
| F | Major crops, cropping patterns in various parts of the country, different types of irrigation and irrigation systems; |
| G | Storage, transport and marketing of agricultural produce and issues and related constraints; |
| H | e-technology in the aid of farmers; Technology Missions; Economics of Animal-Rearing. |
| I | Issues of buffer stocks and food security, Public Distribution System- objectives, functioning, limitations, revamping; |
| J | Food processing and related industries in India – scope and significance, location, upstream and downstream requirements, supply chain management; |
| K | Issues related to direct and indirect farm subsidies and minimum support prices |
| L | Awareness in the fields of IT, Space, Computers, robotics, nano-technology, bio-technology; |
| M | Indigenization of technology and developing new technology; |
| N | Developments and their applications and effects in everyday life; |
| O | Issues relating to intellectual property rights |
| P | Conservation, environmental pollution and degradation, environmental impact assessment |
| Q | Disaster and disaster management |
| R | Challenges to internal security through communication networks, role of media and social networking sites in internal security challenges, basics of cyber security; |
| S | Money-laundering and its prevention; |

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| T | Various forces and their mandate; |
| U | Security challenges and their management in border areas; |
| V | Linkages of organized crime with terrorism; |
| W | Role of external state and non-state actors in creating challenges to internal security; |
| X | Linkages between development and spread of extremism. |

General Studies Paper IV

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| A | Ethics and Human Interface: Essence, determinants and consequences of Ethics in human actions; |
| B | Dimensions of ethics; |
| C | Ethics in private and public relationships. Human Values - lessons from the lives and teachings of great leaders, reformers and administrators; |
| D | Role of family, society and educational institutions in inculcating values. |
| E | Attitude: Content, structure, function; its influence and relation with thought and behaviour; |
| F | Moral and political attitudes; |
| G | Social influence and persuasion. |
| H | Aptitude and foundational values for Civil Service , integrity, impartiality and non-partisanship, objectivity, dedication to public service, empathy, tolerance and compassion towards the weaker sections. |
| I | Emotional intelligence-concepts, and their utilities and application in administration and governance. |
| J | Contributions of moral thinkers and philosophers from India and world. |
| K | Public/Civil service values and Ethics in Public administration: Status and problems; |
| L | Ethical concerns and dilemmas in government and private institutions; |
| M | Laws, rules, regulations and conscience as |
| N | sources of ethical guidance; |
| O | Accountability and ethical governance; strengthening of ethical and moral values in governance; ethical issues in international relations and funding; |
| P | Corporate governance. |
| Q | Probity in Governance: Concept of public service; |
| R | Philosophical basis of governance and probity; |
| S | Information sharing and transparency in government, Right to Information, Codes of Ethics, Codes of Conduct, Citizen's Charters, Work culture, Quality of service delivery, Utilization of public funds, challenges of corruption. |
| T | Case Studies on above issues. |